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Abstract
It is well{known that a transferable utility game has a non{empty
core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non{transferable
utility games balancedness or the more general {balancedness due
to Billera (1970) is a suÆcient, but not a necessary condition for the
core to be non{empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the
{balancedness condition that is both necessary and suÆcient non{
emptiness of the core.
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1 Introduction
A cooperative game with non{transferable utility is an assignment of a set
of feasible utility allocations to each coalition of players. The core of a coop-
erative game selects those utility allocations that are robust to all possible
deviations by coalitions.
In Bondareva (1963) and in Shapley (1967) the notion of a balanced game
has been introduced for games with transferable utility (TU{games). It has
been demonstrated that a TU{game has a non{empty core if and only if it
is a balanced game. Scarf (1967) has extended the condition of balancedness
to games with non{transferable utility (NTU{games) and proved that every
balanced NTU{game has a non{empty core.
Billera (1970) has further generalized the notion of a balanced game. In
his work the balancedness condition is dened with respect to a system  of
coalitional vectors specifying the power or weight of each agent within every
coalition. The existence of the system of the coalitional vectors  such that
the game is {balanced suÆces for the core to be non{empty. Moreover, when
attention is restricted to hyperplane games, a non{empty core implies {
balancedness for an appropriate choice of . In general, the equivalence of {
balanced games and games with a non{empty core does not hold: an example
of a game with non{empty core being not balanced for any choice of  is given
in Billera (1970). Generalizations of Billera's balancedness conditions have
been given for cooperative games in permutational structure (see van der
Laan, Talman and Yang (1998)) and cooperative games in graph structure
(see Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2000)). These conditions weaken
{balancedness and are suÆcient for the core to be non-empty, though not
necessary.
A natural generalization of the {balancedness condition is achieved by
allowing the system of coalitional vectors  to depend on the utility allo-
cations. In this paper we dene the balancedness of the game with respect
to a correspondence  that assigns to each allocation of utilities a set of
coalitional vectors . We therefore allow the power of an agent within a
coalition to depend on the utility allocation that is proposed. We prove that
the core of an NTU{game is non{empty if it is balanced with respect to some
correspondence . Conversely, for a given game with a non{empty core we
construct a correspondence  satisfying the condition of {balancedness.
Thus, {balancedness is not only a suÆcient, but also a necessary condition
for non{emptiness of the core.
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To the best of our knowledge, the only alternative necessary and suÆcient
balancedness condition for non{emptiness of the core is given by Keiding and
Thorlund{Petersen (1987). The advantage of our {balancedness condition
over the condition in Keiding and Thorlund{Peterson (1987) is that it applies
directly to the game of interest and avoids the construction of any auxiliary
games or sequences of approximating games.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 some notation is intro-
duced. In Section 3 we discuss the {balancedness condition of Billera (1970)
and the (;<){balancedness condition of Keiding and Thorlund{Peterson
(1987). In Section 4 the {balancedness condition is dened and the main
result of the paper is proved.
2 Notation
The symbol  is used to denote `inclusion', while the symbol  is used to
denote `strict inclusion'. Let n be a positive integer. Then N is the set of
integers f1; : : : ; ng, and N is the collection of non{empty subsets of the set
N . R
n
is the space of functions x : i 2 N 7! x
i
2 R. R
N
is the space
of functions  : S 2 N 7! 
S
2 R. Let 
N
denote the unit simplex in
R
n
, 
N
=

x 2 R
n
j x
i
 0 8 i 2 N;
P
i2N
x
i
= 1
	
. For every S 2 N dene
the set 
S
=

x 2 
N
j
P
i2S
x
i
= 1
	
, and let  be a Cartesian product
of 
S
over all S 2 N . Let 
N
denote the unit simplex in R
N
, 
N
=

 2 R
N
j
S
 0 8S 2 N ;
P
S2N

S
= 1
	
. If x and y are elements of R
n
,
then hx; yi denotes the scalar product of x and y, that is hx; yi =
P
i2N
x
i
y
i
.
For each S 2 N let 1
S
be the vector in R
n
with component 1
i
S
equal to 1 if
i 2 S and equal to 0 otherwise. For a subset A of R
n
, the symbols intA, @A,
and convA denote, respectively, the interior, the boundary, and the convex
hull of the set A.
3 {balancedness and (;<){balancedness
An n{person game with non-transferable utility (hereafter referred to sim-
ply as a game) is a family of sets V = hV (S)i
S2N
satisfying the following
assumptions:
(G1) For all S 2 N , V (S) is a non{empty proper closed subset of R
n
.
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(G2) For all S 2 N , [x 2 V (S); y 2 R
n
; y
i
 x
i
for all i 2 S] implies
[y 2 V (S)].
(G3) The set V (N)n
S
i2N
intV (fig) is non{empty and compact.
A vector x 2 R
n
is an element of the core of the game V if x 2 V (N) and
there exist no S 2 N and no y 2 V (S) such that x
i
< y
i
for all i 2 S. The
core of the game V is denoted by C(V ). Therefore,
C(V ) = V (N)
-
[
S2N
intV (S):
Below we reproduce the {balancedness condition of Billera (1970). Let
an element  of the set  be given. A collection of coalitions   N is said
to be {balanced if there exists  2 
N
such that

N
=
X
S2

S

S
:
A game V is said to be {balanced if for every {balanced collection of
coalitions   N it holds that
\
S2
V (S)  V (N):
If there exists some  2  such that the game V is {balanced, then the
core of V is non{empty.
The {balancedness condition has been generalized in the work of Keiding
and Thorlund{Peterson (1987). Given a game V and a coalition S 2 N let
V
p
(S) = fx
S
2 R
S
+
j x 2 V (S)g, where R
S
+
is the set of non{negative functions
with the domain S, and x
S
is the restriction of the function x 2 R
n
to the
set S.
1
Let R denote the set of binary relations > on the set N satisfying
the following conditions:
 > is acyclic: If S
j
2 N for all j 2 f1; : : : ; kg and S
1
< S
2
<    < S
k
,
then we cannot have S
k
< S
1
;
1
In the paper of Keiding and Thorlund{Peterson (1987) a somewhat dierent denition
of a non{transferable utility game is given. In particular, the set V (S) is assumed to lie
entirely in the non{negative orthant of R
n
and to contain zero vector. The set V
p
(S) is
assumed to be bounded for all S 2 N .
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 all one player coalitions are minimal: For all i 2 N there is no S 2 N
such that S < fig.
Let  2  and < 2 R be given. A game V is said to be (;<){balanced if
the following condition is satised: If   N is a {balanced collection of
coalitions and
x 2
\
S2
V (S)
-
[
Q2N ; T2: Q<T
intV (Q);
then x 2 V (N). The game V is said to be weakly (;<){balanced if there
exists a sequence fV

g
1
=1
of (;<){balanced games such that
 V (N) = V

(N) for all  , and
 for every S 2 N the sequence fV

p
(S)g
1
=1
converges to the set V
p
(S) in
the topology induced by the Hausdor metric on the set of non{empty
compact subsets of R
n
.
Theorem 1 below gives a characterization of NTU{games with a non{empty
core.
Theorem 1 (Keiding and Thorlund{Peterson, 1987) Let V be a game.
Then the core of V is non{empty if and only if there exist  2 , <
2 R, and a weakly (;<){balanced game V
0
such that V (N) = V
0
(N) and
V (S)  V
0
(S) for all S 2 N .
The purpose of the next section is to give a necessary and suÆcient condi-
tion for non{emptiness of the core that applies directly to the game of interest
V . In particular, our condition of {balancedness avoids the construction of
an auxiliary game like V
0
and does not use the approximation of the game
V by a sequence of games fV

g
1
=1
:
4 {balancedness
As a preliminary result we state the {balanced version of the weak Knaster,
Kuratowski, Mazurkiewicz, and Shapley (K{K{M{S) theorem. The original
version of the K{K{M{S theorem can be found in Shapley (1973). Theo-
rem 1 can be easily established using the xed point theorem of Kakutani
(analogous to the proof of the K-K-M-S theorem in Herings (1997)).
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Theorem 2 ({balanced weak K{K{M{S) Let fC
S
 
N
j S 2 Ng
be a closed cover of 
N
such that if S and T are elements of N and the
set 
T
T
C
S
is non{empty, then S  T . Let  : 
N
7!  be a convex{
valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence. Then there exist x

2 
N
,


2 (x

), and 

2 
N
such that
x

2
\
S2N : 

S
>0
C
S


N
=
X
S2N


S


S
:
Denition 1 Let a game V and a convex{valued upper hemicontinuous cor-
respondence  : R
n
7!  be given. The game V is said to be {balanced
if the following condition is satised: If x 2 R
n
,  2 (x), and  2 
N
are
such that
x 2
\
S2N : 
S
>0
V (S);

N
=
X
S2N

S

S
;
then x 2 V (N).
The {balancedness condition of Billera (1970) is dened relative to a xed
element  of the set . It is a special case of Denition 1 that allows  to
depend upon the utility allocations via the correspondence . By using the
concept of -balancedness, we allow the power of an agent within a coalition
to depend on the utility allocation that is proposed.
Theorem 3 Let V be a game. Suppose that there exists a convex{valued
upper hemicontinuous correspondence  : R
n
7!  such that the game V is
{balanced. Then the core of the game V is non{empty.
We do not report the proof of Theorem 3. Our argument essentially
replicates the proof of the Scarf's theorem given in Shapley (1973) and in
Kannai (1992). The key role in the proof of Theorem 3 is played by the
{balanced weak K{K{M{S theorem.
Theorem 4 below asserts that {balancedness is not only a suÆcient, but
also a necessary condition for the non{emptiness of the core.
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Theorem 4 Let V be a game with a non{empty core. Then there exists a
convex{valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence  : R
n
7!  such that
the game V is {balanced.
Proof. We make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let V be a game and let S 2 N . Then
1. for every x 2 R
n
there exists a unique real number t
S
(x) such that
(x  t
S
(x)1
S
) 2 @V (S);
2. the function t
S
: x 7! t
S
(x) is a continuous function;
3. x 2 V (S) if and only if t
S
(x)  0; x 2 R
n
nintV (S) if and only if
t
S
(x)  0.
Dene the continuous mapping g
S
: R
n
! @V (S) by g
S
(x) = x  t
S
(x)1
S
for
all x 2 R
n
.
Let x

be an element of the core of the game V . Dene the correspon-
dence  : R
n
!  to be the Cartesian product over all S 2 N of the
correspondences 
S
: R
n
! 
S
, where

S
(x) =


S
2 
S
j h
S
; g
S
(x

)i = h
S
; g
S
(x)i
	
for all x 2 R
n
.
To see that the set 
S
(x) is non{empty, observe that it is given by the
intersection of the sets 
 
S
(x) and 
+
S
(x), where

 
S
(x) =


S
2 
S
j h
S
; g
S
(x

)i  h
S
; g
S
(x)i
	
;

+
S
(x) =


S
2 
S
j h
S
; g
S
(x

)i  h
S
; g
S
(x)i
	
:
If the set 
 
S
(x) were empty for some x 2 R
n
, then the inequality h
S
; g
S
(x

)i >
h
S
; g
S
(x)i would be satised for all 
S
2 
S
. In particular, this inequality
would hold for all vertices of the simplex 
S
, implying that g
i
S
(x

) > g
i
S
(x)
for all i 2 S. As g
S
(x

) 2 @V (S), this would imply g
S
(x) 2 intV (S),
contradicting the denition of g
S
. A similar argument shows that the set

+
S
(x) is non{empty. Moreover, both sets 
 
S
(x) and 
+
S
(x) are closed, and

 
S
(x)
S

+
S
(x) = 
S
. Connectedness of the set 
S
implies that the inter-
section of 
 
S
(x) and 
+
S
(x) is non{empty.
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Convexity of the sets 
S
(x) is trivial.
To prove the upper hemicontinuity of , let
 
x
(k)
; 
(k)

be a sequence of
points in R
n
  satisfying 
(k)
2 
 
x
(k)

and converging to some point
 
x
(0)
; 
(0)

. Then the equalities
h
S(k)
; g
S
(x

)i = h
S(k)
; g
S
(x
(k)
)i; S 2 N
hold for all members of the sequence. By continuity of the mappings g
S
, it
holds in the limit that
h
S(0)
; g
S
(x

)i = h
S(0)
; g
S
(x
(0)
)i; S 2 N :
Therefore, 
(0)
2 (x
(0)
).
Next we show that the game V is {balanced. Let x 2 R
n
,  2 (x),
and  2 
N
be such that
x 2
\
S2N : 
S
>0
V (S)

N
=
X
S2N

S

S
:
By part (3) of Lemma 1, for all S 2 N with 
S
> 0 it holds that t
S
(x)  0.
As x

=2 intV (S), we have 0  t
S
(x

). It follows that for all S 2 N with

S
> 0 the following inequalities hold:
h
S
; xi  h
S
; g
S
(x)i
= h
S
; g
S
(x

)i
 h
S
; x

i:
Therefore,
h
N
; xi =
P
S2N : 
S
>0

S
h
S
; xi

P
S2N : 
S
>0

S
h
S
; x

i
= h
N
; x

i
= h
N
; g
N
(x)i;
where the last equality is implied by the fact that x

= g
N
(x

) and by deni-
tion of 
N
. By denition of g
N
(x), this gives the inequality t
N
(x)  0, and
the inclusion x 2 V (N).
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Theorems 3 and 4 show that {balancedness is necessary and suÆcient for
non{emptiness of the core. The condition is relatively simple and provides
a natural extension of {balanced concept of Billera that closes the gap
between necessary and suÆcient conditions for non{emptiness of the core.
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